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·The problem.of a method of historical analysis played an integral

part in the scholarship of Ernst

Cassirer~ German,phil~sopher

and

historian .. ' An Essay £!!. 'Man,' the work f~r which he is best known in
the United States, includes his most lucid discussion of the tasks and
aims of the historian.

The historian must reconstruct the past, in

fusing it with the immediacy of a living expression..

"Rebirth of the

past" gives man a better view of his potentialities, a freedom to see
beyond the demands, characteristics, and contingencies of the moment.
This view of history and the historian's task.was reiterated

2

by Cassirer in several of his works on theory and was implicit in
a number of his books and articles on historical topics.

The follow

ing critique will focus on Cassirer's discussion of history and on
his historical method as it'was demonstrated· in several of his writings.
Despite the criticism of Cassirer's penchant for structure and
affinity for schemata, he has had a
community of historians.

profou~d

influence on the general

His work in many areas was unique, and he did

considerable original research.

He has had some influence on sub

sequent historians, especially with some of the specifics of his data.
Even the abundance of criticisms of his works attests to the serious
ness w:tth which he has been viewed as a historian.
But Cassirer used a paradigm charged with possibilities for
fallacy.

He accepted the idealist.. view that "mind" and "mat tern. are- ...-.

identical, that "mindH operates according to the rules of logic, and
that logic can be applied to the history of thought.

He used the

analytic-synthetic idealist approach, the breakdown and recreation
of a body of data.

The history of, thought--the history of the "mind lJ - 

moved from an analytical period to an organic one in a never ending
process, Cassirer believed.

And at.

ea~h

juncture, at each organic'

stage, there was a transitional figure to bring everything together
again:

Nicholas of Cusa, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, and others.

Cassirer, in his response to the "crisis" situation, to the plethora

of fragmented theories of man, to an analytical period in European
thought, saw himself as a new transitional figure.

His paradigm was

a response to a "crisis" in Kuhn's sense of the word.

1

I
I

J

But at the same

3
time, within the framework of Cassirerts scheme, it was intended to
provide the new synthesis in the development 'of the "modern mind. at

,

Cassirer's synthetic 'paradigm fulfills the criteria Hollinger
names for "successfulu.works in 'the field.

And he must be lauded for

explaining his methodological position and consistently "abiding' by

it.

But if the basic tenets of

his entire model fails as a

and writing.

Implicit

i~ealist'Phil~SOPhY

viabl~ parB~igm

n the

and others is the reco

I

cr~~icisms

are not accepted,

for historical research '

.
'
Foucault, .

Price.Sk~nner.

of Ithe absurdity of these tenets •. The
I

pursuit of the histo'ry

of

..'

f the

'

"

....

nm~nd,,, of the "knowledge of knowledge, It

can only lead to historical absutdities.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

THE MODEL

The p'roblem of a ,method of historical analysis played an integral

part in the scholarship of Ernst Cassirer, German philosopher-and
historian. ,'An Essax ~ Man, the work for which he is best known in
the United States, includes his most lucid discussion of the' tasks and
aims of the historian:
The historian must.learn to read and interpret his documents
and monuments not only as dead remnants of the past but as
living messages from·it, messages addreSSing us in a language
of their own • • • It is this tp'alingenes:is,' this rebirth of
the past, which marks and distinguishes the great historian.
, There is also a prophecy of_,the past, a revelation ,of its_
hidden life" History cannot predict the events to come; it
can only interpret the,past. But, human life is an organism,
in which all elements im-ply and exptain each other. Conse
quently, a new. understanding of the past gives us. at the. same
time 'a new prosPect of' the future which in' turn becomes an",
impulse to intellectual and social life. For this double
view of the world in prospect and retrospect the historian
must select his point of departure. He cannot find it except
in his time • • • (in) our present intellectual interests, and
our present moral and social needs. l
"
The historian must reconstruct ,the past, infusing it with the
<

diacy of 'a living expression.

irnm~-

URebirth of the vast',' gives man a

better view of his potentialities, 'a freedom to see beyond the demands,:
,ch3ract~ristics,

and contingencies of the moment.

This view of history and the historian's task was reiterated by
Cassire-r in several of his \vorks on theory and was 'implicit in a

t·
I

lErnst Cassirer, An Essay ~ }ffin (New York: Bantam, 1970), pp.

195, 197.

I·

I
I
I
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number of his books and articles on historical topics.

The following

critique will focus on Cassirer's discussion of history and on his
historical method as it was demonstrated in several of his writings.
A few preliminary observations about the necessity for method
ological commitments in historical analysis, and about the nature of
these commitments should precede the critique.

Every discipline has

certain aims and methods which are considered indigenous to the dis
cipline; and any historian follows a method of procedure in his
analysis of the past, either implicitly or explicitly.

In the latter

case, the historian may make a statement about the method used in the
analysis; in the former, he may covertly adhere to the method used
by the community of historians of which he is a part.
avoid extreme relativity or
I

I,

~

In order to

chaos of narrative generalizations, the

historian must' appropriate 'or develop a ,flexible but rigorous method
of interpretation and use it conSistently.

This methodology, in its

simplest for.m, may follow a few general rules about the logic of'
analysis'; or it may, at the other extreme, embody large philosophical'
principles abouti the movement of history.
There is only the most general consensus among historians about'
what history as a discipline is and what its procedures entail.
general communities of historians--professional

~istorians

But

and students

who agree on basic rules for doing history--most ,certainly do exist,

.';1

as they did during Cassirer's lifetime.

Any understanding of the

I

works of different historians must be preceded by a' delineation of
their respective analytical, interpretive methods.

These general

methodological presuppositions can be isolated both in terms of the

r

I
I

'''~;'''.i-.'''':
:

1

• "

•

~"

"'!.

~.

•

..

• •

f
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community and in terms of the individual historian.
A recent contribution to the philosophy of science has given
modern scholars a conceptual framework for carrying
of specific methodologies.

o~t

this isolation

Thomas S. Kuhn, in his Structures of

Scientific Revolutions, presents the "paradigm theo'ry, n a conceptual
contribution of such flexibili,ty in application that it has been'
adapted and appropriated by some historians. 2

Kuhn uses "paradigmsU'

to specify eertain accepted methodological examples of

n •••

actual

scientific practice--examples which include'law, theory, application,
and instrumentation together-~('tl1hich) provide models fro~ which

spring coherent traditions of scientific

researc~.n3

The pperating

traditions are based on their ability to organize the experiences of
the specific communities.

An accepted tradition gives the commun~ty'

criteria for distinguishing dif~erent activities" i t sets ~riorities
among these activities, and it gives the community a model around,
which the community's common activities are arranged.

These activ-'

ities--the community's experience--are contingent on the model that
organizes them into a common experience..

And in the process of

"actual scientific practice," in the actual use'of the paradigm, the
community's experience--the specialized'problems considered by the
community using the paradigm--is

tr~nsformed

into something compre

hensible and"tV'ithin the confines of the specific community, concrete.
The "paradigm," then, has a social basis, and its function is one of
2TIlomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Qlicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1971). -,
3I bid.
"

I
I

I

t

p. 10.

4
org.anization.

The community is

~rganized

around the paradigm; the

paradigm is therefore socially grounded.
Tradit.ions sometimes lose their constituencies, Kuhn continues,.
and the community either accepts a ne1:-7 paradigm, or it. dissolves, tl1ith
new communities forming around· new paradigms.

These ~'paradigmatic

Shifts" .are responses to crises situations, in 'tvhich the reigning

paradigms no longer provide the adequate tools to solve new problems,
no longer have the common acceptance of the connnunities.

l-!ost of

Kuhn's book is devoted to discussing these shifts, the."structure of
scientific revolutions."
In a recent article in the American Historical.Review,

.D~vid

A.

Hollinger discusses the application of Kuhn's theory to' history as
a disciPline. 4

Hollinger recognizes that communities of historians

with some common consensus of. opinion on
history do exist.

the.ai~s

and procedures of

They are not as well-defined as scientific communi

ties:•., hut;: their ex.istence cannot be disputed.
')~ong

as ·in other
of the

the practitioners of the discipline of history there
dis~iplines,

dis~ipline

some commonly held beliefs about the nature

that in turn define the discipline.

constitute a.paradigm.

Hollinger lists

a number

order to be deemed "successful,"
scholarship in the

fi~ld

These beliefs

of general.convic

tions that he believes have a common acceptance among

"

~ret

historia~s.

In

Holli.nger contends, each work of

must assure its professional. readers" •

"

that the questions it asks are

comprehensible~

and worth asking; that

4David A. Hollinger, "T .. S.. Kuhnts Theory of Science and its
Implications for History," American Historical Review, Vol. 78 (1973),
pp. 370-393.

•

'0'

5,

the sources it has examined are indeed the ones most relevant to the
inquiry;. that its analysis of the sources has been rational."
ftrational U he means

tt

•

•

•

By

that the author's pt:esuppos.i tions about

'human nature, the behavior of groups, causation, etc•. are either shared

by his readet"s or. are perceived by his peers as respectable,' competitors
to the views of· the readers. uS.

There are many paradigms within this

greater one, Hollinger argues, such as the Freu?ian,

t~e·

Narxian, and

other models of the same" kind.

Cassirer's methodological views can also be seen as a·paradig
matie'model.'

He was to an extent influenced by the reigning paradigm

in the community of which he 1->las a part in his 'early' years, ,the' Neo-

Kantian school at the University of aarburg..

By the time he wrote his

first specific work on intellectual. history, his model had changed
somewhat, but it was part of another community, one whicn his
defined..

I w"i11 attempt, in the followi,ng critique" to

paradi~

isolat~

Cassirer's paradigm and show how he used that paradigm in histo.rical
analysis.

The "crisis" to which he

responded~

the 'community to

'''hieh he belonged, a~d his "philosophy of symbolic . fortnsft-~thc: spring

board of his historical method--will be sketched.

Cassirer's involve

ment in a community. paradigm will be, established and will be critiqued
according to commonly held

~ules

of historical analysis

~d'procedure~.

But I intend to concentrate on Cassirer'~ way of-doing history~: ~ the
model he used to analyze and synthesize specific historical topic$,
rather than on the characteristics of the paradigm's social base.
5Ibid., p. 383.,

',.

.

"

'::"'}";;', ..::.:';.

6

For the purposes of this discussion, I \-1i11 only mention
Cassirer's epistemological presuppositions.

They were, indeed, part

of his paradigm, but' his methodology as it applied to the historian's
craft was not necessarily contingent on his epistemology.

ings on hist9ry

co~stituted

His writ

a real historical achievement in and of

themseives,'and have been recognize4 as such by both those who criti
ci,ze and applaud Cassirer.· Further, Cassirer intended h:i,s writings
on history to be viewed as h,istorica:I wO,rks,.

n~t

epistemological ones.

In other "1Ords, the "crisis" si tuation to \·7hich he responded,

his, academic training and - accomp'lishqtents~' and his uphilosophy of
-symbolic, forms,tr will be .sk?tched only to establish the validity of-

any effort to critique his model ,as a "paradigm" a.nd to provide a
guide 't;o

t~e,

conceptual vocabulary he used ,.. .h en discussing ,methodology.

I wiil 'focus on his view of the historian's aims and

on

pro~edures, and

his methodology as 'it -""as p-ractic.e:d in- his books and essays on.

hist.orical topics and
par~digm",

developments~"

a methodologic,al

mode~"

I '{vi 11 , att,empt t.o isolate a

and will cri~iqu:e it as such .. ,

r

I
j

'.

." ~"'

.

"'. "

CHAPTER II

THE PROFESSIONAL ACADE'HICIAN:
A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Cassirer was a perfect example of the professional academician.
His long and fruitful life revolved arotmd various a·cademic co.mnuni
ties, he wrote for an academic

a~dience,

and his reputation was and

I

is an academic one.

From

l892~

when he, first

en~ered the.Uni~~rsit7

of Berlin, until his death in 1945, 'tvhen' he was' teaching

,at

Columbia

University, he ",Jorked and lived .in a close contatt with academicians
of different tmiversities.

All his 'tvritings. from his book- on Leihniz. '.

published in 1902,~ to hi.s .11rth ,.2,[ the State, published posthumously,
were written for professional scholars.

His work was of interest only.

to the academician and the student, and it remains so today.
His early training was in both philosophy and history. 'He'
entered the University of Berlin at the age of eighteen and for two "
years

~-1ent

from one school to another,

study that satisfied him.

He became interested in.Kantian ,

and those· philosophers involved in its revival in Garman

academic circles at that time.
'I

to find a course of

In the surJmer of 1894 he took a course' on

Kant at the University of Berlin.
ph~losophy

~nable'

The teacher of the course on Kant,

Georg Simmel, introduced Cassirel;' to Hermann Cohen's works on Kant.
Cohen played a pr.imary role

in

the initial reformulation of

Kant t s philosophy as it was embraced by the Harburg School of Neo- .

8
Kantianism.

He rejectad the notion of a noumenal world, the Ding--il;!.

sleh s tanding behind the phenomenal world,.

The categories of reality

derive from pure thought alone, he contended, independently of sensa

Cohen

data.

but

subm:i.tt~d

according ,'to

develo~ed

an epistemology much more idealistic

tha~

Kant,

.it to the same rigoro,us logic. . Consciousness ope,rates

th'e 'laws of logic" Cohen believed.. And because all

reality exists, within consciousness, then all raality is
la~'Ts

Consequen tly, the laws of logic become the

l~gical.

of nature.

All analy

sis operates according to the same standards, except that cultural
and historical analysis' ~ust also deal 1;vith questt"ons' of _value~

analysis of, value questions also

dew~nds a.rigor~us

log~cal

-The

method.

Ethical norms have their foundation not in experience, but in the
structure' of the mind.
I'

!listor.ical Weltanschallungen must be

app.r~ached

and delineated from the s,tandpoint"of·-absol,ute. ,and universal logic and
ethics ..
The only reality similar' to the

Din8-~-~
.

maintained.

is ideal, Cohen

.

,Knowledge of an object ,is .a p,rogressive process.,· History.'.

'is the endless process by which man, th-;-o'ugh the use of reason, accumu- " "
lates pure knowledge of both nature and society.

The objects of both

the natural sciences and' the cultut:'al sciences (K~ltuX'Wissenschafter;)
are known perfectly only at some infinite point in time •. Analysis of
objects of knowledge, and synthesis of the parts analyzed--the

." "j:' : - "
~ ~

.,'

.~

.

9
f' b e. ,,6
knowledge of phenomena--1.s an " unendliche Au-ga

Cassirer l;.;ten t to Marburg and quickly es tablished him.'3e1f as a

leader among Cohen's group of students.

At this time he also studied

carefully the works of Plato, Descartes, and Leibniz.

Mathematics

and' biology '{.vere two' more areas of special interest to Ca'ss'irer 'dur

ing this period'. 7

He had taken 'some classes from Dilthey at' t.he'

University' of Berlin, and. he continued to increase his familiarity

'With Dilthey's attempts to unify the methods of the cultural sciences
(Geisteswissenschaften) &8

Cassirerts doctoral dissertation dealt with

Des~~rtes'

of knowledge~ a~d he used it for 'the ,first section in

'an

theory

ext~nsive

j'

study of Leibniz published in 1902 {Leibniz' System in seinen

,,6Dimi~.ry Ga",.1ronskYJ UErns,t Cassirer: His L~fe and His Work,." itt
~ PhilosophZ of Ernst' C'assi'rer'~ ·"'~d.
Schil1'p, (r1enasha, Wisconsin:
Ceorge Banta Publishing Co., 1949), p. -9. Also. see Georg C." Iggers t,
The German Conception of History' (Middleton, Connecticut, Wesleyan Uni
versity Press, 1968), 1'1'. 144-147; and Ernst Ca~sirer, uHerman Cohen,n
Social ,Research, Vol. 10 (1943), pp. 219-~32.

Pau'i

7Gawronsky, pp. '6, 8.

I

I

8There ha~ been ~~nsiderabie debate over the translation of this
term. The most commonly accepted translations are "cultural sciences, U
or "humanities .. " For an explanation of the concept of Geistes~vissen
schaften arid of Diltheyts philosophy, see H. A. Hodges~ The Philoso2hy
of Wilhelm Dilthey (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952); Rajo
Holborn, rtWilhelm Dilthey and the Critique of Historical Reason:' in
European Intellectual Histo!y Since Darwin and Marx. ed. ~-1. Warren
Wagar (New York: Harper and ROW, 1966), pp. 56-88; Igg~rs, pp. 133
144; For a comparison of the Neo-Kantians t Kulturwissenschaften and'
Dilthey's r~isteswissenschaften, see Rudolf-Hakkreel, n~-1ilhelm Dilthey
and the Neo-Kantians: The Distinction of the Gei.stest.,issenschaften and
the Kulturtvissenschaf ten," Journal of the His tory of Philosophy It Vol.
7 (1969), pp. 423-440.

,

i,

·1

~
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..

/
~
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;

..

~

"
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'
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In. 1904 and 1906 respectively he

edited and publishe.d two volumes of Leibniz',s writings.
While doiug research on Leibniz he began working on a probiem,
that was later to grow into the three-volume Das>Erkenntisproblem~
~Q

der Philosophie und Wissenschaft' der neueren: Zeit (1906,,' 1907,
1920 respectively)'.

..

He attempted to give a, comprehensive, pictut:'e of·

,

.

, -

,

the development of epistemology in philosophy and science from the "

'Renaissance to the present.

These three volumes were not historical

works. but dealt with purely epistemological problems in their his
torical'

developme~t,.

The works are of' a Neo-Kantian orientation in

that their focus was on philQsophers 'and on epistemological problems '

of interest to ,the Neo-Kantian. 10

~funy of the problems and thinkers

he ',considered in these ~olumes'-were re:considereci in
.

,

~orical wor~s,

but for dif~ere~t 'reasons.

ilis', later his~'''··· ._.

His reputati"on
as a
.

~~icholar

'

,

"

' "

"

'·11

was established with the publication of the first two volumes.'
Cassirer continued to write and publish, and

in 1910

his'

I

.1
I

Substanzbegriff und, Funktionsbegriff appeared..

It was, devot'ed to the

problem'of concepts, the' logic of concepts, and the process: and .func
tion of

~onc~ptual knOwledge;~2' S~bstartce

and

Ftmction~ as 'the work
'

"

appeared in 'English',' gave' Cassirer an international,

repu~a'tion •.

Tt, .;

9Cf. R.' Klibansky and W. Solmitz, "Bibliography of Ernst
Cassirer's Writings," Philosophy and 'History: Essays Presented to'
Ernst Cassire~. eds. Raymond Klibansky and H. J. Paton (New York:
Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 338-353.

10Gawronsky, p. 9.
IIA fourth volume was finished in, 1933 and was ,pUblished,
posthumously' (1946).
12Gawronsky, p. 18.

.
.,~~

~_

•
•
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was trCh'lslated into a number of foreign languages.

This

~vork

also

led to Cassirer's split '\vith Cohen over some of t;he specifics of the
.

concept theory.

13

In the next decade Cassirer wrote a number of epistemological
essays and edited several, of Kant's and Leibniz's ,:vritings.
\-101''k

The

upon which his reputation as a philosophar is based was pub

lished in 1923, volume one of Ppilosophie dar Symbolischen Formen
(Die Sprache).

A second volume followed in 1925

(P~anomenolo8ie de~
.
continued to revolve ·.around

Denkan), and a third in 1929
.

.

Cassirer's interests·

(~mythische

Erkenntnis).

problems· relevant

',to. the. Heo-K.antian academic, comfnun-ity.,- 'but the scope
was ~·onsiderably. broadened.

of his

analyses'

The' "philosophy of symbolic 'fonns"

represented a un~que contribution o~ his part~ and ·its aim represented

the broadened scope of his intere'sts and analyses .. : In thes~. volumes
,'.

..,

in turn, is a

prod~ct

..

of aU'endless series of cognitive,

s~bolic

The thre.e-vo'lume .Philosophy of Symboli~. 'Forms purported

activit-ies.

to analyze 'the .structure of these activities, focusing on special
.. categories 0f ·"symbolic ·forms"· underlying' d1ffe-rent .realms' of human

activity:

t·

religion~

art, language, myth, and science.

'By thIs' time. -Cassi'rer"had gone beyond .the Neo-Kantia.."1is·m. of -his

I

Harburg period, and had created an ep'istemology of consIderable- .
. i 1'la1·l.ty•. II..

or~g

l1i5

'concern

for' the historical genesis of 'cultural

13Ib·d
__1._.,. p. 21 •.
14Cf.; "~villiam H. lverkmeister, uCassire"r's . Advance Beyond Neo~
Kantianism,n in ~ I}hilosophy of Ernst Cassirer, e.d. Paul Schilpp,.
"pp. 757-798.



,
~

l'

...

.

12 

'.

--

-

forms is documented by the framework he ,used for the examination and
presentation of the Itphilosophy
of symbolic
forms.
.
- .

t.

This philosophy,

as will be shown· later, necessitated a historical perspective.: ._ Arid·
problem~

his research into.

of the

h~story

of philosophy and the

. history of ideas ,bor~ fruit in, a number of historical ~onographs and. "

essays written arid. published during this p,eriod.

-----

Individuum und Kosmos
.

..!!! i!!!. Philosophie

~

Renaissance appeared in 1927...' In 1932' Die·: ..

Platonische Renaissance

.!..!!.

.

England unci die Schule. ~

.
Cambridg~,

P..!.:: ..

Philosophie der Aufkl~rung, and DaB Problem J .. ~ Rous~eau~ followe-d.

Cassirer, a Jew, did not wait to be dismissed from his 'post a$
rector qf the Un~versity of H~l:nl'rg, when Hitler: bee,arne' Chancellor in
1933.

He 'left Germany, going to Oxford, where.he lectured for two

there for.

~.ix

years,.

In 1941

~e acc~p~ed'

an ·invitation from -Yale

University and came to the United States as a

v~siting, p~ofessor~

He

had originally intended to'remain for two years. only and then return
. to Sweden, but the entrance- of the

his plans.

He continued

"i-1hen he accepted.

te~c~ing

Uni~ed.

States into. the War· changed

at. Y.ale, urtti;t

t~e s~,~r

of

1~44t

'

an invitatiQri t.o teach at ..Co.J;umbia. Uni.v.e1:sity. :

While Cassirer' tias.. in . the United: States .. he. wrote. a ·.number. of

.'

articles of some historical import, inc~uding, ~'Giovan~i Pica della.
1A...irandola" (1942), !'Galil~o.:·

A New Science -and a. New Sp.j.ritl1 (19.42),

"Some Remarks on the Originality of the ,R.e~aiSSaIlc.e" (19.43) t -uThe
Pla~e

of Vesa1ius in the Culture of the Rena:issanceu' (1943)

t

"Nelvt.on

and Leibniz" '(1943), !lousseau, Kant, Goethe (published posthumously,

1946)" and "Galileo's Platonism" (published posthumously, 1946).

He

-

13
continued 'tvriting on epistemological problems during this time, but
his orientation shifted more tmvards analysis of culture and the

state. IS

Both ~ Logj.k der Kultul\-1issenschaften. (1942) and ,An Ess,ay

.2!!. Man, the work forl.".vhich Cassirer is probably best known in America,n
academic circles,

~la9

published just a few months before his death on

April 13, 1945.

15F. S. C. Northrop, "'Obituary:
Review» Vol. 55 (1946), p. 451.

Ernst Cassirer," The Philosophical'
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CHAPTER III

THE "CRISIS" Al'iD THE RESPONSE:

THE PHILOSOPHY

.

OF SYHBOLIC FOR..'1.S

A 'philosophy of symbolic forms' can' ~~ke good the claim of
uni ty and un!versalfty, which metaphysics in its dogmat.ic
form must abandon. Not only can ·it unite these various modes
and directions of our knowledge of the, world; oyer an~ aQove,
this, it is capable of evalu&ting every attempt at understand

ing the 'tl1orld, every analysis of ~t tvhich the human is capable

of, and conceiving each in its true character. It is in this
manner that the problem of objectivity first becomes vis-ible
in .i,. ts full scope; 'and taken in this se~se it encompasses not

.on.~y', the

,C'osttlOS

of t\atur~ ,but also that of cultut'e. 16

,

Cassirer made the above claim for his "philosophy of symbolic fOnDs'"

in a"number of his writings.'· It provides the ucl ue ~f Ariadne," he

believed, leading 'out of the "labyrinth" of modern philosophy.l7

Like many of 'his contemporari~s,: Ca~sirer felt there 'to be'a "crisis'"
in European philosophy, that 'a plethora of' theories ,,,ith little comon
ground made the umodern theory: of. manti a col1~ction of fragm~~ts,..
'This "theory" had.lost its, intellectual.t~centertU, C.as~i~far cO'nt(!nded.

'and tlEach theory becomes a Procrustian bed on .\vhlch the, empirical

facts a·re stretched, to. fit, a precon-ceived. pattern. n
not dtvell

on. the nature .'of

pervasive problem"
II

in

18

tfu.ile. he did

th~ "c,risis" si.~uationtp.e saw'

his era.

it as a .

And his recognition of this situation

15Ernst Cassirer. 1egic of ~~anities,. trans. Clarence Smith
Yale University Pre.ss, 1963)t p. 67.

Hmve (New Haven:

17 A..'l Essay ~ Han, .p .. 24.

18 Tbid .,
---'

<

p .. 23.

\'.
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served as a departure point and

justification~

....

,

~

he believed, for his

"philosophy of symbolic forms."
Cassirer \Vas not alone, in recognizing a "crisis" situation in,

'European culture at that time. 'Some of the labels used by historians.
to characterize the

period-~lIcultural desp~~r, ..19,

udissolving certain

ties, ..20 "the re:volt against positivismn 21_-attest to a general feeling
of uncertainty and· -insecurity,.
,t':lrn

~f

In .general 9' intellectual life at the

the c,entury saw a grmving awareness" by social ph.ilosophers and

commentators, historians, and ar'tists of the limitations of human

knowledge ,and the suhjectiv,e cha):'aeter', ,?f, the'. cognitive process., ,The
positivi.$ts still .as,sumed. the universe to be, an integrated system
governed by ·the laws of mathematics" ' They assumed· the structure of'
both physical and social reality to be

disce~ible

through the methods

of 'the natural sciences.
During this period the pes'itivis'ts' arid' their view of the world

came under increasing attack..
Henri Bergson,
a fet.r of the

Friedrich Nietzsche, t.Jilhelm

Sigmun~ ~re~dt. Bene4e~to

thi;n~ers ~ho

.questioned:' the

Croce"

Dilthey~

Ma~ \~eber--these

v.~lidity

of the,

,

were

posi~iVi.st

.1

'.

. ..

~

.

'

claim for scientific objectlvity iIi social analysis~: .Historians and.. .'

social scientists no longer concentrated on the problem of what

19pritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair {New York:
,Doubleday and Co., ·196f)"~ ..
\.
I
j

I

2fJ r.eorge L. Hosse, The

.ctllt~re. of Western Europe:

and Tt...entieth Centuri'~s (New York:

The Nineteenth

Rand Hc.Nally, 1961),

"P"P7 277-292.

.
2iB• Stua~t Hughes, Consciousness and Society: . The Reorientation
. of European !'.E..cial .!!}ought,1890-l930 (New York: Vantage-, 1958).,

"'.
>

~,

'

.. :~- ::,.

".

,,'~:/'}: ..

,

~:
• • • • .. ~

~ ..
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constituted society or history; instead. they asked

hO'V1

a sciencEl. of

history or society \Y'as possible and, if so, hm·r it m.ight be constructed.
Philosophers no longer searched for ultimate truth within a rnetaphysi
cal framework, 'but attempted to answer questions of the epistemology
and logic of historical thought 'and to do cemparatlve and historical
studies of different philosophies and ideas ..

The "revolt against positivism/' however. did not reject all.
DiltheY"\~eber, Freud, and others'all

'the tenets of positiv·ism.

shared the

positivis~

/

regard for the empirical fact.

They wanted to

. .

.

· eliminate' all 'speculative basis for 'modern .thought t . but they

'ret~ined

, a' strong faith· in scientific' method. as. 'a me'ans 'for: gaining" knm,,1edge
.

----~

· of reality.

___

~_

.

...._ _ _10

•

They did not belie.ve," however, 'that all meaningful activ

ity tvas rational., as the pOSitivists did.

They had- a

~·trong

faith

in .the cognitive process and in logic as vehicles ·for finding mean

tional, the· passionate.

nilthey's Erlebni~,. Bergso~'s.elan vital,

----

----

Freud's ·concept of ~he id; for· example, a.11 represent~d an: effort ·to
find rational categories and.

explanat~ons

for the ii-rational. 22.'

Implicit, also,' was a belief in history 'as a ·meaningful process.·
History and change was process, these thinkers 'believed, and-was

· therefore' discerna'ble by· rational analysis.
defy analysis, but is part of a proc~ss that
"

• I

Irrationality does not
C8..L'1

be .discovered by

· scientific interpretation of phenomenal data.

;,

i

22Cf.. \-]j.lls.on H.. Coates and Hayden V. ,rnite, The Ordeal of Liberal
Humanism' (Ne'to" York: HcGraw-Hill~ 1970). Vol .. 2, pp:2"S6"'1'262,. TI'l1-284 ..
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The essent'ial characteristic, of the "crisis" period in European

thought, then, consisted in the revolt against positivism, against

the belief in the rational systematic nature of all physical and
social processes. ' The validity of scientific method' as a tool for
knowing reality '!,.las not

rejected~

of the empirical fact.

A systematic, IQgicql

nor

,wa~,

the belief in the'validity
~~th9d ~as

used by these'

thinkers to delve into the realm of t'he irration'al, to ,rationally

understan4 subjectivity and irrationality.
Cassirer ,followed his 'contemporaries 'in
method for analyzing reality.

H~

loo~ing

synt~etic

for a

had a,profound belief in the value.

of the phenomenal fact and·: the' s.cientific l1!ethod" ,coupled with a rejec- ,
tion of any speculative' explanation of reality.

'He saw the essential

natl.ire of the "crisis" in Europe-an philosophy ,to be a 'COltflict ~.e'Cween·
empiricists and idealists, between positivists and metaphysicians,.

'between rational ideation and'phenomenological experience:

as

\-That would seem to c~nstitute: the bias of ,'empiricism'
"(yeil
as abstract 'idealism', is precisely that, neither of them f~lly
. and clearly develops thi's fundamen,tal, relation. One' posits a
concept of the given particular but fails to recogn~ze that
any such concept must always, explicitly or implicitly, encom
pass the d~fining attribute~ of some universal; the pther
asserts the necessity and validity' of these attributes out "
fails to designate the medium through which they can be reore
s.;;n ted in the g1yen psychological world of censciousness. 2~' ,

.

'. ~

"Idealismtt refuses to recognize the .empirical,. phenomenolog'ical basis
of'reality:

uempiricismt • fails to explain

hOly

empix:.ical reality is

cogitated in' the "world o'f consciousness. II
2 3Erns t Cassi rer, P!liloso~hy of Symbolic Forms: Language, trans.
Yale Dnive,rsity Press, ,1953), p,. 110.

R.. Hanheim (Nety', Haven:

J'

:

.~

~ :,~~:"~
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"If, ho.....rever, n Cassirer continued, "tole start not with 'abstract

postulates but from the concrete
dualistic antithesis is resolved..

~asic

form of spiritual life, this

The 'illusion of an original di.vision

bet\,zeeI\ the intelligible and the sensuous, ·the

vanishes." 24

t

The "concrete basis for spiritual

idea' an.d 'phenomenon'
l~fe,n

Cassirer con

tended, is found in the symbolic function, in the epistemologic.al
process described by the "philosophy of
Cas:3irer saw

h~s depar~4r~

~ymbolic forms."

point, then, in the recogniti.on of

the "crisis" situation in Europclan p~ilosophy, and his mission in the

·1

eXP'9'sitiq,n o,e a neVI .ucenter,". o.ne that would provide a Hconceptual

.unit.Yt.~. to .the. anarchy ..of cul~ural..and sC.ie.ntific.

data .. 2S

His, "phi.':"

losophy of symbolic forms" '-las in~ended to provide that "unity. U

'The·

main t~nets o~ Gassirer~s phil,osoph;i.cat system will be presented,

belotol.

**********

s~one o~ hi~ .1~1:l:j.los<?'phy; ..i~

cultural

forms~

th.e belief in ~he exi.E!tence· of a UIl.iye'l;,sal.

only chat of logic,. the concept, cognition,

.

.

s~ems

0,26
',' The mos.t significant

enjoy a true' a~d .aut1:tet:tt~c. aueono.my....

to

c~nt.ri~

button tn the histpry ··of philosophy came from the Gr.eeks., Cassirer
• I

,,' 24i!lid .. , pp.• I1D-1.11 •
..

25Essay, p. 24.
! .

26Philosophy

of

Symbolic "Forms:

LanBuage,

p. '63..

.' . ..'
.. •.•.i.

~

.
~

•

20

of concepts of the nature of man, seeing the crucial change coming with
the acceptance of the Copernican system by philosophers and scientists.
}fontaigne's words--nthat man alone is able to value things according

',to their true estimate and 'grandeurH--are taken by Cassirer as a

r

• .. • clue to the whole subsequent development of the modern
theory of man. Hadem 'philosophy and modern science has had
to accept the challenge contained in these words. They had
to prove that the new cosmology, far from enfeebling or
obstrut,ting the po'(~er of ,human "reason;' established ~nd con
firms this power. 31 .

Such has been the aim of philosophy, he believed, and such 'o1as

th~

stated aim of his own thinking.
The uc;risis" of modern philosophy '(-las the condition, cognitive
philosophy was the means" and self-knot;ledg.e t.;as the aim of Cassirer t s

mission, his search for the "clue of Ariadne."
could be fmmd in the symbolic function.

This clue, he believed,

The primary characteristic

of the human world distinguishing it from the animal \Jorld is man,' s
abil~~y

to symbolize, experience in art, religion, myth,

h~story,

and

science. ',Between the tt1-e-ceptor, systemn , and· the "effector, systemU - ' 
I
: I

bettveen the stimulus effectiori and th~ response articulation-lies
, I..

'"

the "symoolic system. ,,32

I

..

..

It is an artificial medium, Sf~ symbolic net II

• 0 f h uman exper1ence.
. ' u33
t h e t.'1ng 1 e d 'tIeD

,.,...LD b e sure, t.h
i·
e cogn
tl.ve

faculty' ,is possessed by all "humans, but it is an inadequate term,

Cassire:r helieved, to express the symbolizing function of ,D'.an.

Instead

of being defined as an, "animal ,rationale," he should be defined as
311b;d
---=-..•. , p. 16 ..

32~.,. p .. 26.
3Jlbid., p. 27 ..
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an "animal symbOlic.um. u34

.An analysis of this function~ then:. pro

vides a path out of the "labyrinth" and provides a conceptual unity
for understanding both culture and 'science, Cassirer argued.
The beginning point for such an

analysis~

for' delineating the

symbglic functio~, come's wi'th a definition of spee~h:
fornts are 'active e:;-tpr,~ssion forms.,,,35

nAIl culture

"Emotional language" and

"propositional'language" are the two types of language found in the
h\11 1 an~uage h as a

organic •.;orld.

.

certa~n

H

•
l t1nge,
'
,,36
emotlona'

nemotional language" proper beldngs, to the an~l:1a~, "-To.-rld
Cassirer sometimes called it, the "primitive '.;'Qrld. if

<1n4"

but

as

Nan gives

expression a' theoretical 'form, he objectifies experience of, ph-enOlnena
tlll:o~gh :langu~g~,

pract:,:i,.,Sl,a;t

imagi~iation

, ,,,>,~}::~~;;::; "

a ne~l' .,:f-qno:

'

,...... the, a+1ima). p,qs;;esses, a

he symbolizes:

and i'!.Jtelligence whereas man alone has developed

.'.

•'

.

...

a symDol~c imag~nat~o!~ and' inte 11.l.,gen C.f!

37
to

It

,Cassiret:, retold the story of Helen Keller's development of

" .
.
38
..,'
ve:rbal skills', 'as an . illustration of _t.his,:tene,t~ ',The day" sh,e ,:learned

every: thing has, a name IJ and thB. t 'the manual alphabe t is the key to
trese names, she began to see relations, to abstract

under~tanding

.. ,

r. .

.

..

func.tion., to s}"mbolize:
~~--that

'.

"

"It had to be 'unders,tood. that everythina ~

the symbolic function is not restricted to particular

35Logic

o~ ,the Humanitie~" p. 10.

36Essay; p. 31.
,,37 1 , "d

~.t

p.' 36 ..

38Ibid •• pp .. 36-39.

...J.
j
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cases but is a principle of universal applicability which encompasses'
the whole field of human thought. n39

"Propositional expression"

concentrates not on the content of language-':"the substance of language-
but on tne process, the function of language.

Only'in the function of

theoretical language can we discover ,a universal principle •. Substance
varies from language to language, even lvithin anyone language; but

the symbolic function is. the same for all.

All human languages demon- "

strate the propositional, the theoretical, the symbolic ,form of human·
experi.ence •

. those relations in the abstract t is aiso
symbolic thought.

All

relatio~al

't~i thin

is a part of:t

t1\ought,. .all reflective thought., is

contingent on the symbolic process.
confined

dep~ndentt>

It frees man from a life

ft

the limi ts of biological needs. and practical interests. U
acces~ .t~

It gives man ".

the 'ideal

H~rldt

which is opened

..

..

,
"
,,40
from different sides by reiigion, art, philosophy, science. ~t

'An.. es·sential.. ,~acet ,of

,t~.i~. symbo~~c.: process,

'i

Cassirer argued. is'.' .

I
I

..the unique human I vic'to1. of time. and' space, ",indeed ~," the type of t"iine

and space man operates in.
"organic. u41

-

.

The 1m"est stratum. of time and space is

Animals follow ins'tinct ,and "bodily itnpulses,,42 in

39 Ibid·• , p. 40.
(

.

40 Ibid .)

p •.

42Ibid. ,,' p ..
I.

45.

4" . '
.
"'"Ibid .. , p. 26,

4i..

."

_,'

"
~J..

.

..... :
'-,..

I
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their experience, without any semblance of any ideational processes.
Man also acts within this realm of "organic space," but he' works in
begi~s

another, higher, stratum when he

begins to work within an" abstract of
space of geometry, it is a

II •

.-

•

to ideate, to symbolize.

u s ymbolic

t1

space. 43

He

Like the

homogeneous, universal space:

it:

was only in ,the medium of this new and characteristic form of space
that man could arrive" at the concept of unique, systematic, cosmiS

order. ,,44

In this space appearances are not merely handled, they are,
;
represented and their relations ,considered. ,

time.

"Organic" time is' a process, a stream of events, where past-,.

present~ and.~uture

are joined in a constant movement.

In the animal

"world, experience is a part of that movement, and time is never

abstracted.

Universal time" the time of human culture, is to be fQ,und.

in the human ability to remember. ,_ In memory, Cassirer asserted,
.' former 'impr~ssion~- are llriot only repeate~, b.ut must ,also
and

'lcica~ed';

·and referred

.to

different

be

ordered

poi~ta, of t~me ..fl45 " 'In

order

to do this, time-,must, be cons"idered· as a general. scl)eme, as a "serial

order'. 1146

In' the ideational- process man arranges events in sequential

orders within comprehensive schemes.

And it is not the facts, the

contents -of, these', memories, 'that give the. scheme its ooiversal meaning.
43 Ibtd • , p. 48.
44 Ibid • , p. 50.
45Ibid. , p. 56.

46 Ibid • , p .. ·57.
,,-

,

.
• , 'j.,-'

;

It is, once again, the conceptual' fO~t the functions of the contents
that demonstrate the tmiversality-, and meaning of the scheme':' "The

'integral' of consciousness is constructed not from the sum' of its,

Sensuous elements (a,b,e,d" • • • ,), but from tJ:te totality" as it
were, or its differentials of relation and form (drl" dr ' ,dr , • • • )~47
Z
3
Meaning is not de_rive~ from the contents--the usensuous elements tt.:..

of the serial order in memo'ry(Uconsciousnesst1) ~ b~t: frpm the relations

and ftmctions of. those contents.

Past expe.rienc.e ,is, ~ot, just repeated,

~n .memory, .it is reconstructed; and.this reconstruction process is a
.tl'Q. i

the

y~:rs~l . ,chara.cte.ris.tic .. C?~.' 'fi1a~!, ... It·. i~ ... ~ $y~bo.~i:c~ .pr~~ess t .. ~.ti~iz.iri~

phenomena of ..the past .. ,.. The poetic' imagination and historic.al

inquiry both play ·a part in this recollection

·proce~s.

Cassire'r' 'did. not exclusi:vel:y: concentrate on the relation

pr~sen t to".. the. PAS.t;,. howeye~ ~ . H~ also defined what he called "the

dimension of the future.n4~

He identified the existence'of a:.

"theoretical idea of the future,/' one that .is a prerequisite for .all

19

'

cultural· activities. ~ . It ·is, essentl.ally, the "symbolic .future,."

the' capacity of man to- forn:tulate ideals or symbols of his fut'ure.· In
this sphere lies man 11 s· ·essential .freedom, the .frE7edom .to conceptualize
utopias. to forsee, to prophesy, to plan the. future •. Symbolization of·.
the future make~

tt.

•

•

'room f.or- th~ possiq~e· as oppqsed to .passi-ve .

aC<Juiescence in the present state Qf affairs.

47philosophy

o~

It is symbolic thought ..

Symbolic' Forms: Language, p. 105.

48Es'say, p. 58.

49 Ibid ., p. 60.
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which overcomes the natural inertia of rnan and endmvs him \yith a new

ability, the ability constantly to reshape his human universe. usa
Hith universality and "conceptual unity" as criteria, Cassirer
elevated, 'proce;;;s ,over
precludes the latter.

co:nte~t.

fu~ction

s~bst~nce.

nature but also that of culture."

u•

• • not

,fQrIJu.:~r

only the cosmos of

Cassirar maintained the only valid

of culture must limit its scope to man'stwork. H

concentrate on the

The

Only in function can man find universality,

a "conceptual unity" that encompasses

a~aly~is

ove,r

cr~ative

51

,It must

pro¢ess, the creative function.

It ,is this' 'Work, i~ is the system'of human activities, which
'd'efines' and determirie$ the circle of' 'humanit:y~" Language,
myth~ religion, art, science, history are the constituents.
the various .sectors, of th;i.s c;::.i t;'cle ~ A t philoSQphy of man t , ,
would therefore be, a philosophy ~lh.ich ,would give us insight
i~to the f~d~ental s,tructure of each of these human activ-'
itles .. and '{.·lhich at the ,same time Hould -enable us to under
stand them as an 'organic ~.Jhole •• 52

The "philosophy of symbolic forms," then, revolves arotmd a
method in which function, the elicieed need for conceptual

Unity~

the
"

poetic imagination, and rational analysis ?lay major roles.' Cassirer

.

I
I

. I

,

used much of the conceptual vocabulary of the "philosophy

of

Sy'"mbolic

I

forms" when discussing his method 'of doing history, as will be seen
in the following chapter.

,

.

50 Ib1d ., p. 68 ..
51 Ibid .. , p. 7 l t ..
·52

Ibid., p,. 74 ..

.'
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CHAPTER IV

SYHBOLIC RECONSTRUCTION, FUNC!I"ON," lu'iD STRUCTURE:'

THE PARADIGU

It might be possible to maintai'n that Cassirer's vie'to:: of hi$tory'
merely an extension of his epistomelogical views,. of his t~philosophy
of symbolic forms."

But to do so would b,e to neglect Cas~irer Isreal

histori.cal achievement.

It is possible to analyze his- methodological

par~dignr, concentratin'g' on h~w' it i~' u~ed"in 'his hist.orical works,;
\vithout extensively considering his' apistemological disposit,ions.
The former cha.pter ,'(<las included only to f.amiliarize the ,reader with,

some of the terminology and conc~pts, Cassirer uses ,in disc~ssing 'his,

method of doing history and, to demons.trate that ,Cassirer did make a
UresponsaU" to ,the "crisis" s'it'uation in, European philosophy;. " Cassirer

did believe ,a structural orientation is, necessary for any

histo~ical

:j
I

analysis and'synthesis':

"History itself, 'Would be lost in the bound-

less mass of disconnected facts if it did not have a general structural
scheme by means of 't-1hich it can classify 11 order" and orga.nize· these

facts." 53

But a full comprehension of his l1philosophy of symbolic

formstJ is not necessary'for understanding his .particular structural
!,

orientation, for understanding the .paradigm he used for dOing history.
It might also be possible to maintain that Cassirer was. not.a

,h.istorian of ideas,.but a historian

of.philosop'hy~

using the criteria

53 Ibid ., p. 75--76.
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Paul Kristeller uses to delineate the
the .~ournal

£!..

t'<10

realms.

In an article in

the History of Philosophy, Kris teller desc~ibes commonly
I.

accepted definitions of the two closely related e.ndeavors," the history
of ideas and the history of philosophy. ,The historian of ,philosophy,
Kristeller maintains, concentrates on the relations of
o50phical idea or problem
~Jho

t1.

•

....

given phil

to the .. context of the philosopher

expresses it, and to that of his contemporaries,
phi~osophy" Ii

successors in the history of

a

~redecessors,

and

A historian of ideas includes

ideas from the discipline of philosophy as objects of study" but he
also '(-larks
giou,

~-1i. th i~eas

n ....

~'lithin

from art I Ii t~rat,'..1re. the

s,cien~es,

and reli

the context' of the ..... thought \vith which they

may be more or: less con~ected_tf54' The historian, of 'philosophy is'con
cenled with problems of philosa-phr, their developm~nt and philos9phical
,

backg-round,

,~hile

,

the historian of .ideas deals

science, art t literature 7 religions, as

w~ll

~l7ith.

the p1:oblems of

as philosophy_

Cassirer claimed philosophy and the history of philosophy as his
.r~alms

of 'operation.

to philosophy_

Philosophy should focus on defining the nature of man,

Cassirer maintained.
t~ons

It should center on a delineation

as well as the potentialities of cultural life.

vides the milieu in
Ca5si~er's
th~

But he gave a special and quit.e broad definition'

~.,hich

culture f.ormulates .i ts',

~de:as

of

the limita

Philosophy pro-·
and principles'.

state!:lent of purpose in the preface to the Philosophy

,Enlightenment best summarized his,

vie~v

E!.

of philosophy.

54Paul Kristeller, "The History of ~hilosophy and the History
of Ideas," Journal 'of the ,History of Phl1oS0!lhy, Vol .. 2 (1964), p.' 13~

.--
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Such a presentation of philosophical doctrines and systems

endeavors as it were to give a 'phenomenology of the phil
osophic spirit'; it is an attempt to shotv how this spirit,
struggling 'Ii'ith purely objective problems, achieves clarity
and depth in its understanding of its mm natur~ and destiny,
and of its own fundamental cha-racter 'and mission •• ,. Phi

to

'losophy, accorq.ing
this interpretation, is no special field
of knowledge'situated beside or above the principles of natural'
science, of law and governrnent, etc., but 'rather the a1l
comprehensive medium in ,which such principles are formulated,
developed and formed. Philosophy is no longer to be separated
from science~ history, jurisprudence, and politics; it is rather
to be, tha atmosphe're in 'tvhich they c'an exist and be effective.
Philosophy is no longer the isolated substance of the intellect;
it presents the totality of the intellect in its true function.
in the specific character of;" it.s investigations and inquiries',.
its methods and essential cognitive 'process. 5S
,Cassit"er gave ,philosophy a special itnportance, one that '{vas closely

tied

to

his assertion of' ·the need for a structural orientation' in'

app'roach~ng

historical facts.

In liis 'tvrltings, the history of phi-'

losophy is the history of ideas.
,~xp't'essions

'inat

might be

It includes any ideas and cultural

a part· of

the uall-comp'r..ehensi ve rnediuml~

in which science, history, jurisprudence, and
operate.

politi~s'exist'and

tolith this in miqd, an examination of Casslrer,'s sy~tetna~ic

method, his' "symbolic reconstruction'" paradigm, can be examined.

**********
, The beginning point in any analysis' 'of .Cassirer's method' lies
in a consideration of '\;<lhat he believed constitutes 'a hi'storical

nfact~ n

Historical Ufacts lt obviously, do not' have a material 'or physical exist
ence and meaning, and any historical "facet can be understood only

Frit~

55Ernst Cassirer" ~ .Philosophy.of the Enligh tenment:t trans.
C. A. Koeiin and 'James P. ~ett.ygro'\1e (Boston: Beacon Press,

1965), pp. vi·.. vil..

'f
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through analysis of that meaning.

He therefore emphasized "monuments"

as the first' index of historical "facts":
t-Tha't is actually preserved for us from the past are spe~ific

historical monuments: 'monuments' in word and writing. in
picture and bronze.

Th'is first becomes his tory for, us when

in these monuments we see symbols, through which we not only
recognize specific forms of life, but b virtue o~ which we
are able to restore, them for ourselves.

S6

The historian" ,like the scientist, lives in the physical world.

But:

the data of history, unlike those of the natural seien,ces', is not.
initially physical or material.

Historical "facts" acquire a phYSical,

pbjective meaning only through

an:~analysis

of their symbolic meaning •.

The historian discove'rs Ufacts". through the mediat:lon of symbols: ..

. "Not things or events bot documents or monuments
immediate objects of our historical knowledge.
ation and intervention of these

. hi~to;ic'ai

..

d~t:a---the e';'en~s a~d

~ymbolic

are·th~ first

and

Only through' the

~~di-

data can w-a g:r;asp the real .

.

the men of the past. u57

Historical

'.

"facts" are symbolized in "monuments" and ~ocuments.

The historian

returns to these "facts" through an analysis o'f this symbolic data.
"Symbolic reconstruction U is the label Cassirer. gave to the proc

ess of interpreting tl:tis "symbolic data. n
and "remembered. n,

Symbolic data is gathered

Critical judgments are made, the data is arranged.

in serial Qrder in time and space, further' judgments are· made-, the

"facts" in the "monument'" are discerned, more reconstruction takes
place, and eventuallY' the historical event in all its significance is

depicted.

TIle process is not one of simple reproduction of the past.

-: J ..

..,.

. .

I.

~.

." ?; '.: .~~ :

.~ ..

"
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Cassirer recognized 'the impossibility of such an endeavour.

Historical

analysis is a recreation, he said, a une'tv int-ellectual synthesis,. a
constructive act .. ItS8
The'meaning of' a his torical' It fact'" can never be discerned

out this reconstruction.

,,,i th:'"

An' attempted reproduction ,and isolation of

the event would give only a small portion of the meaning, Cassirer
contended.

The histori~nts work is never done.

,and synthesis

is an en,dless, assignment. ,No

Historical analysis

singl~ flreconstruct~onn

has ,a purely objective certitude t but must be subjec'ted. to continual

analysis in the future.
The

"constructive act~1t again, demands the historian to make

interpretive judgments on the data before him.

have a double face.

They

are~-t'...ecessarily

torian must st:rive ·for dbjectivit!y.ence and predelictions

~lhen

Tnese judgments

subjective"

He cannot

making judgments.

exca~

-b~t,

the his.........

hi"s mm expe'ri

He should. ho'tvever,

be :R..1are of his passions without haing passionate.:. __ "History is a
history of..passions" but if history att.empts to be p~~"sio~ate, it. .

ceases to be history.uS9

Judgments about the .past are inescapably

they force the investigator to enlarge his perspective beyond the
, immediacy and pure subjectivity of the "moment:
By making us cognizant of. the polymorph.ism of h'uman existence

it [history] frees us from the freaks and prejudices of a

I

1
J

I

204.

I,

,-

,

'

_"

. . . . . . ~.

I

p
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special and single moment. It is this enrichment and enlarge
ment, not the effacew.ent,. of the self, of our knowing and
feeling ego, tvhich is the aim of historical kno'tY'ledge. 60
History does not concentrate on the individual ego) but on the

!,

'

collective .ntan.

It· 1s anthropomorphic., ;But obJectivity remains a

goal for the his,torian.· History and

historic~l

judgments ,comprise an

,
61
"objective anthropomQrphism."
Enlargement
of the self--"objective anthropomorphismu--is' ,the
.
.
Logic is the means.

.aim of historical analysis and judgment.

,The

·doing of history is a ,hermeneutical process, an.interpratatLon prQ-,
cedur,e t entailin,g a logical analysis of symhols as they e:<ist in

Hmonuments,lt in documents, in the

ph~nomena'

of the past.

judgments are therefore both·universaland particular.
analysis'does hot have a .logic of its

-mm,

... thought iS',always

also particular in their. orient,ation'
historical phen,omena.
plicit;y in unit4y..

Historical

for logic i's univa'r~al ...

Judgments are. universal because -'logic. is universal.
in runction"as "

Historical

They are universal

univ~rsal.n62

beca~se

th~y

,But they are-

_.;ie,a], with

p~~ticular

Judgme.nts are a unity in multiplicitY:t a

Tflult~-

,Analys:is and.. synth~si~ of particulars are inex

tricably conjoined by the rules of universal logic.

**********
:me ,form and function of. :ideas., rather than their subs,tance: and,

6(}Ibid. ,. p. 212 ..

61 Illi .. , p. 211..

62Ibid •• p. 206.
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llistorical meaning resides in becoming; it is not merely a category
of being.

Symbols mus.t be analyzed--umonumen'ts" and "worksn, must be

exanlined--ln terms of their function in the stream of cultur.al ,
.id~ation·.

'. Neaning is',not

fl.!I1ctional and, dynamic.
~assir~r_believed.

~emporal

and static, it -is systematically,

There is a certain c,ontinuity in, ,substanc.e.

Certain ideas change slowly in their content.

But-

the ·function of these ideas can change·.dramatically~, giving meaning to
an entire age.

Cassirer best .stated. this concept through a river meta-

Nevertheless the dist:f.nction [batwe-en. }·:iddle Ag~s and Renaissance]
haa a real meaning. 'tfuat we can express by itt and tvhat. alone
we in.tend ,to expres's, i.5 that _trom the beginning of the. fifteenth
century onward' the balance between the particular.forces--society,
state, ·,religion,- church, art,· science--hegins to shift slowly. 'N'ew
forces press up out of the depths and alter the previous equilib
rium.' And ~ha tharacteJ; 'of,~e.yery. culture res,ts on the _,equilibrium
he tween the force,S that give it form. tfn~never t therefore, we
ma,ke -any .comparison bet'tveen the }tiddle Ages- and the R~naissance,it is neveL to single out particular ide.as or concepts. \·]hat \Ve
want. to know i.s not the particu~at" idea as such, but the impor
tance it possesses, and the strength '<lith which it is acting in
the whole structure. '1~liddle Ages f and t Renaissance' are two
g~eat and mighty streams of ideas.
When we single out from
them a parti~iJl?r ,idea, we ~.r~ do:tne Hh~e .a ~'tt~~i~t. do~s i'[1.. ,
analyz~ng the water of a stream· or what a geographer does in
trying to trace it to its sQurce_ No one de~ies that these
are interesting and important questions. But they ~~e neither

the only nor the more'irttportant for the historian of ideas.

The historian of ideas knows that the "water 'tvhichthe Mi-iver
carries wi th it changes only very slowly. The same ideaS are·'
ah~ays appearing again.-·and again, and are maintained for· cen

.turies.

The force and the tenacity of tradition can hardly. be

overestimated. From this poin.t of view. ~.,e mus't acknowledge
that there -is nothing new under the sun. But the historian·
of ideas is not asking primarily to/hat the substance is of par
ticular ideas. He is .asking 't..rhat ·their function is. What he
is Rtudy:ing--or should be studying--is less the content of ideas,

than their d~amics.

To

continue the figure. we could say that

he is not trying to analyze the drops of water in the river, but
that he is seeking. to measure 'its' width 'and depth and ascertain
the force and ve'locity of the current. It is all·these· factors,

!
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-

~
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that are fundamentally altered in the Renaissance; the dynamics
of ideas have changed. 63

The "function" of ideas, then, consists of their "dynamics" in rela
tion to the "equilibrium bet,\leen the forces" that give a culture its

form.

The historian must focus on how ideas are used

by different

thinkers, how these ideas "func tion" as cultural e':.cpressions in th-e

cultural milieu.

For example, the view of knowledge elucidated by Nicholas
Ct:SUi1US

in De docta ignorantia r,-epresent.ed a

fT

/

comp letely new tot.al

/'

.systems of later thinkers, one, that "las to make Cusanus lithe fi.rst

"

mode'rn thinker. It . J...
of

rl.~a.litYt"

Quite simply, CUSantlS argued that the two types

the ab~ol.ute and the empirical,' the infinite and the

finite It are conjo:Lned in the '\lay they are known •. The empir'ical fitlit'e
't.,orld can be known positive.ly,. through comparison and measurement,
and tha absolute infinite reality can then: be

defi~ed

in terms of

, what it ..!2..~, in- terms of what" the finite world is .. 66

This concapt

of knmolledge, as it vIas" explained in de tail :i.n ]?e Eocta ignorantia
I

had a role in the systems of later thinkers, Cassirer·believed.

It

was significant both in the possibilities it offered and in the
'63Ernst Cassirer, nSom~ Remarks on the Question of the Original
ity of the Renaissance," Journal of the 'History ~'Ideas, "Vol.. 4 (1943),
p.. 5.5.•
64Erns t Cassi rer, The Iudi vidual nnd the Co'smos it'!." Renaissance
Phl}o~oEhy ~ trans ~ Ha"rio-Domandi (~ew York: Barnes and Noble, 1963),
p.. ).').
·65]:bid."~ p. 10·.. ·

.66~., p. 11.
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orientation it took.

Indeed, it constituted the single most important

doctrine in the thought of the Renaissance, and its. importance'1;-la5 a
functional one. 67

Shaftesbury's concep-t of "disinterested pleasure,u68 Lessing's
.
.
h 9 Rousseau , s i d ea 0 f '
V1ew
0 f rat i ona11ty,'
tne

these

~1d othe~

ideas were· explained by

For example, Lessing's'view of

n state

Cassir~r'

o!.,.. nature It 70 -

in functional -terms.

rationality--that'reason-~

-as it is

-immanent in history, provides a guide to natural religious truth--is

~mport~nt" ·becau~~··9f:. i't£? ro~e.

id.'.

lat:-er th~ori~ing' on .'tl.is~~ry;.:

He [Lessing] has always been the great rationalist, and he
. 'remained so to the' last; ,but he' replaces' artalytit.al reasOn'
\-lith synthetic reason,. and static' reason with -dyn,amic reason.
Reason does not exclude motion; it' seeks' rather to' understand
the immanent law of motion. It is reason itself that now
plunges. into the stream of becoming,' not in order to be
seized an~ carried along by its swirls but in order to find
here-·its own· security and assert its stability and constancy.
·"In this·-idea of r.eason·we hav.e .the dawn of'a new"conc-eption
of the 'natur~ and truth of llistory which could n~t achieve
maturity, perfection, and confirmation in the realm of theology
and metaphysics. It'is Herder who ·takes the last and decisive.
step in this development "-'lhen he directs his question at
his torical reality as a ~vhole and tries to answer· it on the
basis of the concrete evidence on its phenomena. But Herder's
.contribution is only in appearance an isolated achievement.
It does not1represent a break with the thought of the Enlight
enment but evolves slowly and steadily from this thought and
67 Ibl.d.,
.
p. 7; also see IOf, 23f, 41 t 56'; for its role in the
thinking--or-Ficino, 63£; in Picots .thinking~ 87f.

68Ernst Cassirer, TIfE! ~latonic Rena.iss·a~~e t· trans •. J. P·.·
Pettygrove (Austin: University of Texas Press, ~95.3~t p. 195 •

. 70Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau, Kant~ .Goe.the, trans~ James Gutmann,
Jr. (Princeton: Pr~nceton University
Preis, 194j)~ ~. 10.

£aul Kristelle.r, John H_ Randall,

,
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matures on its soil. The probl~m of history for the philosophy
, the Enlightenment arises in the field of religious phenomena,
and it is here that this problem first be.comes urgent.}l

Lessi.ng's "idea 'of reason u '!;V'as im.portant for the role it played in
,his mm ,philosophical system..

But. it was also' significant because

it rep'resen.ted the IIda'tyn of a new conception of the nature, and truth

of h.istory."

His "idea of reason" had a func.tional importance in

later theorizing on

'histo~y • .

Further,' Spin6za,

Le,ssing,~

and other

Enlightenment thinkers produced ideas that, in their functional
4evelopment,~

tua,~ly

played a part ,in",Her-dar"s. thinking on his'tory and e'4ien';;'"

,contributed to the op~ri:ing of; the: u~-Jho12 horizqn, pf,,, the his-,

torical \vorld. ,,72

*********..'c
'Cassirer was fairly consistent in' this- emphasis ,on' ft..ttt<;tion ~
on synthe'sis, and on ~he dynami~s of ideas.

He was also consistent

in the manner l.n ~vhich he app'roached these' dynaniics., i~' the method

he used to identify those cultural functions that characterized a
particular thinkEbr, group, or age.

He uS'ually began" at least

ostensibly, with the individual and the phenomena of the individualts
u~·lm:·ks
an~

f H

r.:.oved into broader generalizations about groups of thinkers

concepts, ,and

n sp1r~
. • t"

0 f'

ev~ntually'

came

to some conclusions about the

\. . agaw

t~e

71The Philosophy
72Ibid.

fI

of

the Enlightenllle~t, pp. 195-196 ..

p.,,' '196; .also cf. 182-196 •.
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"Rousseau's fundamental thought," Cassirer a't'gued~ "puts before
us an objective formulation of ques tions; and this formulation is
valid not for him'or his era alone but contains, in full sharpness

'.

..and <;iefiniteness, an inner, strictly objective necessity."

of

attempted ~Q delineate th.e "systema.tic coren
1·dea~ u

74

conc~udad

and

that Rousseau

~as

a

tt

73

He.

_Rou~se~u' 5 nfundament~l ..

true son of the Enlight

enment,. even when he attacks it and triumphs over

it.n7~ ; Similarly~'

Nicholas Cusanus -represented the focal point, the point of departure".
,.

,



. ot

'·'H;s.. thought
'blossoms
pne-.
.
.
...
. . . .out of -.

tne Quat.tx;:o.ce.nto:

~

~.

~Q.t~11~H'!t4al
. ."
.'.

;;

ser:!d (De docta ign.aran tia) that progres~_i ve1:y ~.mf~lds a.n~t .l:~ this
p-rocess of unfolding, absorbs the entire range and the entire

"76
kndwledge in the Quattrocenta. If

Problernatik of
------

Ne'tvton and Leibniz

,

represented

VIlO

choose between

alternative ufundaI!len tal philosophic methods'~:

0010

alternatives.

In the dispute be~ween' Newton and
"

'.

Leibniz these alternatives "tvere cle.arly indicated. It 77

I

'I

'When

analyzin~>

the Cambridge

concentrated

more on the philos"ophy of the .group .a$ a coherent. "whole" than on .

!'

the 'individuals within the' group.

73E~nst
Peter Gay (New

I

But still, he purported to shOt'"

Cassirer, The ~estion of ~-Jacques Rousseau, trans.
Yo~k:
Columbia University Press,. 1954), p. 40.

74philosoehx of the
I

Plato~ists, ,Cassir~r

Enli~hte~ment,

-p.

2-58~

75~o" p.' 274.
70 The Indi ",idual and the CosmQs, P e.. 7 ..
77 Ernst Cassirer, nNewton and Leibniz, U The ~1:i16s0ph~
Vol. 52 (1943), pp.. 366.
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how they represented a "genuine ancient philosophical tradition.

n78

His statement of intent in this essay gave a good metaphorical summary
of his method.
What this stu~y 4~s inten~ed to show is t~is: .that the pr~~lems
with which the Cambridg~ men wrest'led are not' antiquated, but
have entered directly into the formation of the modern phil
osophical world; and that their influence in an altered form
persists today. The Cambridge School forms a sort of connect
ing-link between minds and epochs; it is one of the piers of
that bridge linking the Italian Renaissance with Ge~an human
. ism of the eighteenth. century: The course of the history of
thought does not advance from peak' to peak,; .. and the history
of ideas cannot be adequately treated~ it, as is still the
practice of ,the historian of/philosophy. consideration is
'given' only to the ,graa't. philosophical systems. If 'arie would
understand the significance of ideas, one ,ca~~ot overlook
. 'their imane'rit structure. But our' insight into this structure
is possible only when, instead of concentrat.1.ng our attention
exclusively on the high points of the great systems, we take
our way through the, valleys and from there' b~ a gradual .and
patient ascent work our way up to the peak. 7
Cassirer's analysis moved from the inf:lividuals--the "valleys"--to'
the "spirit" or "mind" of the epoch, the "peaks" in ·the range.
The same method was explained in his introduction to TIle Phi-'
losophy of the Enlightenment:'
The real philosophy of the Enlightenment is not simply the
sum tot~l ofl what its leading thinkers--Voltaire and
Montesquieu, Hume or Condillac, d'Alemhert or Diderot,
Wpl£~ or Lambert--thoug~t and taught.... ,It canJ;lot. be pr~sented in a summation of the views of these men, nor in the
temporal sequence of thei~ views; for it consists less in
certain individual doctrines than in the form and manner of
intellectual activity in general. The fundamental'inte1lectual
fO,rce~ with which
are here c.oncerned
be grasped only in
action and in the constantly 'evolving process of ,thought, only
in process can the pulsation of the inner intellectual life
of the En Iigh.tenment. 1;le fe~t.8.o

we'

<

can'

78The Platonic .Renaissan'ce, 'p. 202 •.·

79Ibid., p. 201.

80The PhilosophI,E! the Enlightenment, p. ix.
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By arfalyzing the doctrines of indiviuuals and synthesizing those
functional elements representing the epoch, the "philosophy of the
Enlightenment" \Vas de:.ffined.

Cassirer follovled the same procedures ;i.n

his. other historical works.

In synthesizing the dynamics of the "formation of modern thought U
Cassirer concentrated on the problems different .·thinkers discuss •..

rather

~~a~., t~e relaJ:~d.th~~s

of their ideas, on .Eroblematik rather
~

._

than Thematik. ..He

't,;Tas

•

"'.'

'\r..

.:.

....

.;

~,

in t~res'ted primarily .in the questions asked

-rather than the solutions reached, an' emphC:lsis corresponding to his
'concentration on function and on the dynamics of thought.
problematical in their development, he contended.

Ideas are

Their "full deter

mination" in any other terms can take centuries:
The his tory of philosophy shows us very cle·arly that the full
'de termination of a concept is very rarely the ~vork_ of that
thinker who first.introduced that concept. For a philosophical
concept is,. generally speaking, rather a problem than the solu

tion of a problem--and the full significance of ~his problem
cannot be understood so long as it is still in its first
implicit stage. It must heconte explici t in order to be··,com
prehended in its true ~eaning, and ·this transition from an
inplicit to an explicit state is the. work o~ the. future.8~
Concepts are only illusively static in their initial statement,
Ca'ssirer believed •. ·Th·ey should be" seen in te·rms of the questions
they pose ·and the function they have in the development· of thought.

0nly then can· tlf.~11 deteminat:i6n" of' any.· ide.a be .compr:el;1ended •

. '81Es~ay, pp. 199-200.
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Some problems are so pervasive in specific historical periods as
to characterize those periods, Cassirer believed.
significarit ~robiems' of the Renaissance, tor

One of the most

example,

was the question

o~. the sUbject-'obJect" relati:onship; of . tbe ihteraction l>etwe'en f;tni.te

ego and

infipi~e cosmo~;

Man, the Ego, appears to the Universe, the world, at once as
the enclosing and the enclosed. Both determinations are equally
~ndispensable to express the. relationship to the cosmos.
And.'
thus a continuous mutual reaction and continuous interaction
takes place between them • • • The ~go can face the infinite
cosmos inasmuch as it finds within itself the principles by
't~hich .it knows .tllat;the COSIn,?s' is infin~te •. But this. knowledge, .'
itself is not of a ~ereiy abstract or 'of a purely discursive
kind. It is an intuitive certainty that springs, and contin
uously rushs' forth, not from the logical intellect but from
the specific. and vital. principle of the Ego • • • The philosophy
of the Renaissance never resolved the dialectical antinomy·that
is enclosed in this double relationship. But it has the indis
putable merit of having determined the problem and handed it'
'down in a new form to the ToIlowing centuries, the centuries- -_ ..
of exact science and ~yst,ematic philosophy. 82
The "dialectical antimony" between Ego and the Cosmos was .the most
characteristic problem of Renaissance philosophy. Cassirer argued.
And

i~

had a functional importance that transcended the epoch, that,

played a role, in the thinking of "following centurie·s. If
Cassirer also used a problem approach to the ideas of the
Cambridge Platonists.

Some of the questions they

considered~,he

contende'd, were of considerable· .sign~~ica,nce in ,the development of the
European "mind":

Mere, within a narrov circle of thinkers:and in a remote
section of the learned world, questions were being 'hammered·
0':1~

which are to

~ff~c::t t.~e

8ZThe Individual and

!!:!!:.

very,

~o1)cepti:oYl: an.d stru~ture

Cosmos, pp. 190-'191.

. ..

.

'"

- .
~
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of the modern mind.' The following considerations endeavour
to show in what light the Cambridge School viewed these
questions, under what presuppositions it form~l~ted them,
and by what means it tried to solve them. 83
When discussing the Cambridge Platonists, as in his discussions of
other nistorical periods~·Cassirer asserted'~

belief

in the'recurrence

or even contiri,uity of specific p'roblems in different chronological

periods.

His contention that there uis nothing new under the sunH

except in the manner in which problems function in the Ustreamlt of
ideas i'g seen in the above examp,le, as in o'thers. 84

, • 'cha'racteristic' pr~bl~~s ' of:' ea~h' pe~i~d~:' a~d ' the~'

'on

A focus on the
their' dynainic

role in the making of the umodern mind" is seen in all of Cassirer's
',historical writings.
It can be argued, of course, that such an emphasis

transform~

dynamics into statics, that an analysis and synthesis of function
transforms it into something, substantial"something other than what
it is.

But such is the procedure of "symbolic reconstruction. 1t

historian cannot 'reproduce history; it must be recreated.

The

In the

proce,ss, certain unIties of functional serial orders are defined.
!

These unities became historical substance within the content of
Cassirer's synthesis.

**********
These functional unities do not have a real existence in a

particular epoch, but are heuristic, logical unities.

I

,

83Th~ Platonic Renaissance, p. 7.

84 See above, p. 26.'

They serve
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only to explain, not to describe the reality of the epoch.

When dis

cussing the dispute over Burckhardt's definition of the Renaissanee,
Cassirer outlined .one of these unitt.es:
Our controversy as to the originality of the Renaissance and,
as to the diViding.. . line 'between' the··s Renafssanee t. and the
'Middle Ages' seems to me.in many ways rather a 'logical'
dispute than one about historical facts. Ideas like 'Gothic,·
:fRenaissance t ' or 'Baroque' are ideas 'of historical •style'. t
As to the meaning of these ideas. of 'style' there still prevails
a"gre~t lack'of clarity in'many respects.
They can be· used
to characterize and interpret intellectual movements, but they
express no actual historical facts that ever existed at any
time. 'Renaissance' and 'Middle Ages' are, strictly speaking,
,not names for historical periods at all, but they are concepts
'. or 'i.deal types',' in .Max W~be-rts ,sense. 'We cannot th~refbre
use them as instruments for any strict division of periods;
we cannot inquire at what temporal point the Middle Ages
'stopped' or the 'Rennaissance' began. The actual historic~l
facts c,ut across ang extend ove'r each other in the most
complicated manner. 5
He discussed this concept of. "unities" more carefully in The Logic
of the Humanities.
---------

.

'

I

!

!I ;

..

What we are trying to give expression to here is a unity 0.£
direction, not a unity of actualization·... The part'icular
individuals belena together, not because they are alike or
resemble each other, but because they are cooperating in !!,.'
common task, which, in contrast to the Middle Ages, we perceive
to be new8:'nd to be the distinctive 'mea:ning' of the Renaissance.•
All genuine Iconcepts of style in the humanities reduce, when
analyzed more precisely', to such conceptions of meaning. The
artistic style of an epoch cannot be determined unless we gather
into a unity all its divergent and often patently disparate
artis tic e'xpressions • • • Such expressions do indeed characterize
but they do not determine; for the particulars which they co~
prehend' cannot 'be de'duced from them •
B~t it is equally incorrect to infer from this that we have
only intuitive descripti~n here, and not conceptual character
ization; wa are dealing with a distinctive manner and direction
.or cha'fact,eriza§~on, 't.,ith. a. logico-intellectual activity, which
is sui seneris.
:

85 u Some Remarks on the Question of ~he Originality of the Renais
'sance. ff pp. 54-55.',
8tThe Logic'of the Humanities, pp. 139¥140.
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Cassirer's concept of nl og ico-intel1ectual u unities of meaning
based on historical. ttstyl e" is not one of his clearer ideas.

It

tied ,in closely with his advocacy, of "the need, for a '~general struc

and organize • • • facts. n8~

.

"

An analysi:s and synthesis' of the COlmlon .

questions asked by a group of thinkers and of the function those
questions

have

in: th'e

i~teliect~l ~ystems

0'£ 'those

thinkers

as

well

as in the t,ho,ught of later thinkers expresses a "unity of direction, fI,_'

a ncharact~riz~tionU of an, ag~.

!

,

Th,e, .~ateg0o/ of "character:lzation,n-

-the' 'Jl Renalssant.e, n .. the UEnlightenment," the' nmod~rn min~', II 'e_tc~~does

not have a real. historical existence.

not describe the reality of the period.

The "characterization" does

The particular facts of the

historical reality cannot be deduced from the

I~characterization. n,

But th'e particulars--the "facts" discerned behind the 'umonuments"

are grouped by the historian

a~cording

and their unity of "direction."

to their

commonal~ty

of function

The resulting-synthesis 1s a heuris

tic one, a "logieo-intellectual" category which is sui ganeris, which
interprets the

~'intellectual

movement" but does not embody -its specj.f1c

historical
reality.
11

**********
Empirical analysis-"symbo11c' reconstructionU--of the "monuments~'
combined. with imaginative recreation of the "facts!) behind ·the

ttmonu-,

- menta'" produces his,torieal, knowledge.' A close, analysis and synthesis,

87Essay, pp. 75-76.

'

....
.
. ' : • • .('
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of the

ItDlonum~nts,n

centered on Problematik and function, yields those

meaningful unities which constitute history.

And this knowledge has .

a special place 'in the "organism of human" civilization, U Cassirer main

t;ain~d.~ 88

+t

is a necessary,component of 'man's se1.f-knowle.dge, ~'an '
••

~

.,

•

•

. . '

,

-'

. '

•

•

, . ,

.... .o.

'"

•

89

By

indispensible instrument for building up our human universe."

understanding man's Itworks"-his cultural expre'ssions--in the past

and by recreating the history of the creative process, Cassirer be
lieved man can better view his own potentialities.

Histori,cal.

m~1l'lory

. is a ~ecess,ary co~~::)'~~nt ,of: ~n' S. ~uture life and of.. .his, freedom.

Cassirer believed history to be the process of revealing man to

h~-

self, 'that he can' better free himself of the limitations placed upon'
him by contemporary cultural expressions.
embodies this -freedom.

Historical reconstruction

In history and in the historical perspective

exis,ts the objective proof 'of "hUlIlanisti"c potential. of tnan's con
sciousness, of freedom in necessity.

j'

I

88Ipid ., p.,- 22~.

89 Ibid ., p. 228.

I
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CHAPTER V
FUN,eTION Ai'iD THE RAGE. FOR COHERENCE:
,

THE

'

Pl~IGM

CRITICIZED

It would be an overstatement to say Cassirer left no loose ends
lying about.

.

..

Despite -his penchant for structural' Uunities" he was

simply not as systematic as he wanted to be.

Enli.ghte~mtJit, f~r- example,' ~ppears

to

be ,a

The Philosophy of the

~ollec-tion

of

conne'cted

essays, rather than a systematic work defining, in all its unity,
the "mind" of the Enlightenment.

Nevertheless, Cassirer intended to

be coherent and systematic and he

intend~d

related unities.

his works to be seen. as

He constantly referred back to his earlier works

when writing about certain topics.

He saw his various works on

history as having organic connections, much as he saw the

ships between the epochs he was analyzing.

relation~

And he made statements

of intent within each work that belie any attempt to see his'works
I

as anything but systematic unities.

For example, in the introduction

to The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy he stated

his intent accordingly:
What is needed is the' universality of a systematic point of
view and of a systematic orientation which in no way coincidea
with the universality· of merely empirical concepts used in
.the. perio,dization, of. ·bistory for c9nye,nient .classification.
To supply this will be the aim of the following study • • •
. it int~nds t.e; remain within. the realm ,of the hist,ory of, phi~
'osophical pro~lems, and 'to
on 'that basis, to. answer the,

seek,
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question: whether and to what extent the movement of thought
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries constitutes a self
contained unity despite the mUltiplicity of starting points '90
and the divergence of solut,iQ~s to, the various problems, posed.
,
'91
In -his '~'Platonie' Renaissance, he stated a simil~r' intent,
as
-

did

in'~

.
PhilosophY' o'f

.....

".

.

~

"

~

Enlightenment:

I

e fundamental ~ntellectua1 forces with which we are here
oncerned can be grasped only in action and in the constantly
volving process of thought;· only in·process can the pulsation
I
Qf the inner intellectual life of the Enlightenment be felt • • •
~e present book bas tried to accomplish this taskt'not by
~ndeavoring to give a history of individual thinkers and their
tea~hing but by mean~ of. ~ hist~ry of the ideas of the epoch "
.' 6f "t.ne Eri.,lighten~eni ~.',.: ';.: 'Th,~i a1m of. 'this' "p,oQk ~aS simply to ...
develop and to explain historically and systematically the
content and point of view of the philosophy of the En1ight·
enment. 92

E

Even Cassirer's revisions of facts could not escape the struc
tural artifice he created:
I avail myself of this opportunity to revise a forme,r statement
made in my Individuum and Kosmos. In the'second chapter·I
tried to show that Nicholas of Cusa's philosophy exerted a· '
strong influence on the .general development of Italian thought
in the'Quattrocento. I still think this. to be highly probable,
but I should perhaps have spoken w~th more caution. I quite
agree that, on the strength of new historical evidence, we '
can not give a ,direct and definite,proof of this thesis. It
is possible that Ficino conceived his general theory inde
pendently of Nicholas of Cusa. In this C'ase the close, relation
ship between the two thinkers would be all the more. important
and interesting from the pOint of view of the general history
of ideas. For ,it would'show us-the connnon background' of the
philosophy of the fifteenth century--,the general intellectual
and· religious -atmosphere of the 'Renaissance. 93
r

~

•

•

.90The Individual- and the Cosmos, pp,.. 5,- 6.

91The Platonic Renaissance~ pp.
92The PhilosophZ

of 'the

5

t

7.

Enlightenment, pp. ix,-x, xi.

93 Ernst Cassirer, .uFicino's Place in Intellectual, Biat.oIy,"
Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 6 (1945}, p. 492.
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The structure was of primary importance, and "facts" had to be organ
ized within the structure.

I have therefore chosen to consider Cassirerts 'works as a
"fairly 'consistent 'unit'y, despite my criticisms of ,him for doing't,he'

same with other thinkers., It is assumed in· the following critique
·that Cassirer consistently followed a structural paraidgm, and that

he refused to sacrifice it to reconcile anomalies.

A number of logical

errors in his works will be criticized, but the main focus of the
cri~.ici~ms wiJl be on ,h~s m~s~i,.qf. str.ucture,
. o,n his ,,"rage for

.

"

coherence."
When reading Cassirer, one has difficulty sep,erating
and facts, metaphysics and phenomenology.

structur~

,His writings are filled

with references, to "motifs, n, "essential problems, It "cores," "the

modem mind," the "Renaissance," the "Enlightenment," and other cate
gories of similar breadth.

Cassire,r claimed to be using such catego,ries

as nlogieo-historical ideal types U as heuristic devices to "charac.
· b e i ts hi stor~ca
. 1 f aetna1"~ty~ 94
ter i ze n a peri 0 d b ut not to d
escr~

However, if his

int~nt

is ignored, and these categories are

viewed as having some substantive descript~ve reality, two further
possibilities present themselves.

'crftiqUed for its

real

Eash category as a whole c.an be

historical ~xistence, or the faet"s "tyithin' the

category can be critiqued similarly!"'" In the latter

can

be

~~se,

the categoTy

seen as the Stm" of indiVidual realities.

"",
~ ' : _~

•

•

" •• : ,:. ..

~

:

•(. 't

I

~~
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The two

views~

then--that Cassirer used such' labels ,as logical

structural de:vices, or that he used them as descriptive devices-can
be critiqued. ,If the former view i~ accepted ,and Cassi~er'~ categor-:
ies are viewed as nlogieo-historical 'sni.'generis," with the meaning
in the category itself, then his works defining the "Renaissance,"
the "philosophy of the· Enlightenmetlt, If the "core" of Rousseau's thought,
and others are idealist solipsisms or at best, fictions.

Or if the

categories are assumed to have some substantive meaning, an abundance
of criticisms are encountered.
..

..

!

...

.

:

Kingsley Price, in an article on The Philosophy of the Enlight
'enment, critiques the possibility that a "mind of the Enlightenment H
diu" ex~st.95
•

He quotes Cass i
' s state d i ntent i on:
~er

The real philosophy _of the_Enl.ightenment, is, not s'imply the sum,._
total of what its leading thinkers ••.• thought and taught.
It cannot be presented in a summation of the views of these
men~ nor in the temporal sequence of, their views, for it '
consists less in certain individual doctrines than i~6the
,.form and manner of intellectual activity in general.
The idea of the '''philosophy of the Enlightenment" as some vague
composite of individual doctrines in terms of general "Intellectual
activity~'

seems an inexplicable illusion to Price.

Cassirer warned

the reader, Price notes, that he did not intend to discuss "certain
~ndividual
..

writers ..

doctrines," nor the summation of the doctrines of individual
..

And,

11 • • •

having been assured that, neither of these is

appropriate, without having been given, any positive indication as to
95Kingsley Price, HErnst Ca~sirer and the Enlightenment," Journal
of 'the History of Ideas, vol. 18 (1957), pp. 101-112.
'
96 See above~ p. 28.
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what will do, the phrases 'thought of the eighteenth century,' 'mind
of the Enlightenment,' and their fellows remain without meaning for
us • • • under these conditi.ons' the. attempt to sunman'an idea of an
'epoch or a century"engaged in thought .collapses utterly.1'r9!'.. The idea 
that the categories have a descriptive substantive meaning fails
miserably.
If it is argued, however, that Cassirer concentrated on individ
ual thinkers and their ideas in, his historical works, and that his
categoJ;i~,s

wer.e

i

me:(e~y co.mpo~it~s

o,f these, ideas," he is. liable to

even more criticism.' He confused the structure of the categories and
the facts of the ,situation,.-, arranging the facts to meet the criteria

of the structure.

','--

Further', in the process of trying to describe the

logical progression of ,ideas, ,he made several errors of logic.
The individual thinkers and their'ideas become fleshless parts
of the structure.
reconciled them.

Cassirer didn't compare

diffe~~nt

thinkers, he-

He· found a niche for everyone he considered.

Rousseau was a "true son of the Enlightenment" even in his attack on
the

nr;nlightenm~nt.n

Herder, with his innovations in historical

thought, was also seen as part of the unity of the "philosop'hy of the
Enlightenment":
And yet, much as he outgrows the intellectual world' of the
Enlightenment, Herder's, break with his age was not abrupt~
ILis progress and ascent were possible only by following the
trails blazed by' the Enlightenmen't. This age forge'cl' the
weapons with which it was finally defeated; with 'its, own
97price, pp. 108-109.,

. "'~ ~. .
. . . 1*
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__
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clarity and consistency it established the permises on which. .
Herder based his inference. The conquest of the Enlightenment
is therefore a genuine self-conquest. It is one of those
defeats which really denote a victory, and Herder's achieve
ment is in fact one of the greatest intellectual triumphs of
the philosophy of the Enlightenment. 98-'
'. .
.
-

.

.'

~

The histQry of individual thinkers becomes the pis tory of abstractions,

analyzed in terms of their relationship to the structure.

The ponder-·

Ous "mind of the Enlightenment,1t like other categories 'Cassirer used,
keeps reappea~ing as the ,supreme arbiter•.
Quentin Skinner t in his essay "Meaning and Understanding in the ..

History of Ideas," 'identifies'several fallacies'of logic applicable

to Cassirer's paradigm, and these can be added to the above.cri~1cisms?9
Again~ Cassirer's stated intent will be ignored, and the history of

the Renaissance or the history of the Enlightenment will be taken as

the history of

ind~vidual works~ --Skinner is concerned with: looking at

the problem of procedure
~---""",-" .... -

- -

in

arriving at' 'an understanding·

of -a' -work ...

...* , -. . - . . .

•

His analysis of the "school" that concentrates on the· text itself in'
dOing this includes several useful

.critic~sms..

~racing

the histOrica.l .'

development of a doctrine~ Skinner says, leads to several logical
absurdities.

First of all, to do so is to

~ssume

that there is an
..

"ideal type" of the given doc~rine. and that it· is .immanent.. in history t
even if it is not stated completely by an individual thinker...

~

Most·

of Cassi~e-rt.s nlogic~hi.storic~l,,.' '''~de~l 'typ~n categories are ~ubject.

to this criticism.. Cas.sirer wrote about. individual wor.ks .as if .they'

:
98 The Philosophy of the ,Enlightenment t p. 23.3.

99Quentin Skinner~, IIMe~ning and Understanding in the His~ory .of
Ideas," History and Theory, vol. 9 (1969), pp. '3-53.

.

;
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•
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:
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were organic entities, immanent in the seedbed of history, and in the
process of approaching the "ideal type," the category
.Th~s'

vif?~

of

h.i,s~ory also

itse~f ..

leads to st;atelltents of. "anticipation, If

. ' ..

Skinner argues._ - Cassirer was' continually guilty:,of .this error, of .
seeing the ideas of one thinker "anticipating" .those of a later one.
When discussing Shaftesbury, for
"Shafte~bury

thus c.reated for the

example~

fir~t

Cassirer contended that

time a

f~rm

center for the future development of genius. ulOO

philosophica.l

An even better· ex

ample comes with Cassirer's explanation of the consummation of Pico
della Mirandola's philosophy in later centuries:
For the influence of Pico.' s philosophy was great and manyMt
sided, and extended to almost every realm of intellectual
life. The great theme announced in his oration nne hominis
dignitate" resounded thereafter in the most diverse variations~
in a gradually stronger and stronger crescendo. We hear
it in the religious conflicts of the age of the Reformation~
we hear it in the new philosophy of nature, and we shall
finally hear it--though in altered fo~-in the modern
rebirth of philosophical idealism, in Descartes and Leibniz.
The aesthetics and the theory of art of the following
,
centuries likewise drew upon Pico and took from him many
of the basic problems and themes • • • The ·occulta· con
eatenatio· of his own basic ideas and of his seemingly
incompatible theses Pica was hardly able to make clear even
to himself~-much less to make accessible to his contemporaries.
Only posterity, only the further' philosophical development of
the problems, could bring it like. buried treasure to light. lOI

PieD not ,only Hanticipated" later thinkers, his ideas found
fruition only in.those thinkers.

Cassirer's belief that'later inter-

praters of an individual's doctrine can understand the doctrine better

lOaThe Philosophy of the Enlightenment, p. 318.
lOlErnst Cassirer~ "Giovanni Pico della l-lirandola, n Journal of
'the Histo~ of Ideas, Vol. 3 (1942). p. 345.

':
•

•
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than that individual himself and his method of seeing the individual
in terms of the "spirit" of the epoch fall .into a related fallacy,.
the .fallacy 9f .prolepsis.

l'

.

\.

--'-':' -,,---

.....

He committed the .error .of giving each idea,.'

doctrine, or '''work'' the shape of an organic entity that, in its
historical function, approaches an immanent "ideal type."

Each "work"

is a seed-germ, growing to fruition only in the systems of later thirtk-·
ers.

Each "'t'1orkn has to await .the

fu~ure

to find it.s full meaning.

Cassirer committed. another fallacy identified by Skinner, the
fallacy of finding "coherence" ~hen it is not. reall.y there.
attempt~d

He

to find the "core" of the philosophy of certain individuals

in its relation to the group or age being discussed.

His interpreta

tion of Rousseau is the best example of his "rage for coherenc,e."
Roussea~'s

if

diverse influences on later thinkers is of no

att~ntion

thought."

is directed only to a

del~neation

consequ~ce

of his "fundamental

Further, the assumption that each oeuvre has a "coren and

is a systematic unity is a redundant error in Cassirer's writings.
-The only unity the oeuvre embodies is one of discourse or explanation
on the part of Ithe investigator. , The oeuvre

~s

a "reflexive category, tt

a "principle of classification," used by the historian for. the
purposes of explanation and, as such, .does not describe a historical
reality ~ 102

Ca~sirer collect'ea the Ufacts~t of lndividual doctrines,

l02Mlchel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledae, trans. A. M.
Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1972), p. 22. Foucault is con
cerned here with dispelling the idea that the collected 'works of any
,particular: thinker comprise a unity.' . The. concept ·of oeuvre, he, argues,
'is a reflexive category of the investigatorts discourse and muSt
analyzed as such; th~t it constitutes an intrinsic and self-evident
unity is simply a delusion.

be

I.
i

......- . .,'
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of the ideas expounded by groups of thinkers, and the "spirit" of

epochs into structural unities that become abstractions of the initial
material.
Another error Cassirer

mad~

is seen in his

assumptio~.that

a

delineation of the "function" of an idea will give the meaning of the

idea.

To do tllis, Skinq.er points out, "We cannot write about the

idea itself, the sentence, but only about the st·atements. made about

the sentence."

103

Cassire-r:~s

of abstraction again..

"rage for coherence"- makes him suspect

Even "furtction" was contingent on the unity of

the scheme.
Cassirer.'s use of Ufacts" was also affected by his deference
to structure·, to the coherent scheme.
were important_only· in

~erms

Again,. the individual "facts"

of the greater category.

Cassirer be...

lieved historical research to begin with the analysis of "monuments."

Through this analysis, the "facts in the monumen.t" are dj.scerne.d.
.

The

..

"facta" in each "monument" are dependent on thf:! relationship between

"monuments. n

.

And as that relationship changes,

"facts" changes , accordingly.
theae relationships.

the meaning o.f the.

Cassirer made certain assumptions about

He assumed, for example, that all of an

indiv1d~

ual's writings, his oeuvre, constitute an organic and coherent whole •
.. ' I~ some· cases,. most ,notably with the Cambridge Plat.onists, he assumed
that the "monuments"

wit~in

a school o·f thinkers form a coherent whole.

Tberefore,.the "facts U and the meaning of the Ufacts tl form a coheJ;"ent

..
...

f

~

•

..

.. ..

!.
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unity.

Again, his "rage for coherence" leads him to defer to structure

at the expense of the p·artic'l.llars of the ana1:ys"is~
I.

Moreover·, the: "monuments" Cas·airer used revolved around" the
thinking o·f·· individuals.'· He had little concept of, causa:lity.
•

"

~

~

• •

:"'.

'.~

. . . .

'
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ical t political·,.· and psychological motivations are disregarded.-, He -did

make a pallid, attempt to fill in a few of the details of Rousseau's
" life, but these were

obv~ously

of small

Rousseau's intellectual documents. 104

iIQ.p~rtance

.in the light of, ~

Cassirer assumed a cognitive

cornerstone for ·all ·intel·lectual ·constructs.

The cognitive ,faculty

is universal, he believed, and intellectual "monuments" represent.the
workings of that faculty.

They are symbolic artifices, created by

the symbolizing mind, isolated from

~hei~

political,

economical~

social

and psychological environment&.~Q~

Cassirer gave the. reader' a topology of conceptual patterns.
within a rQugh chrono!ogical'framework•. And even this framework was
carelessly constructed."
chronological' errors.

He~has

106

when he discussed how one

been criticized for making blatant

And chronology was of little or no importance·
thin~er

"anticipated" a later one, or how,

an earlier doctrine found fulfillment in a later one.

He noted

l04 Ernst Cassirer, ',The question of Jean-..Tacques Rousseau, trans.
Peter Gay (Bloomington, Indiana: ~ndiana University Press, 196-7)",
pp. 7-32.
, 105ct~ Herbert "DiecktUann,' "An Interpretation of "the Ei-ghteenth
Century," Modem Languaae Quarterly, vol. 15 (1954), p. 309; John
Herman Randall, Jr., "Cassirer's Theory of History as Illustrated. in
His Treatment of Renaissance Thought, II in The, Philosophy ~ Ernst .
Cassirer, ed. Paul Schi1pp,. PPl> 703-4. uS o far as Cassirer's analysis
goe~, It Randall comments, tlthought might as 't~ell be operating. in a vacuumt~

l06Diec~~ann, pp. 299, 303.
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'similarities between the 'ideas of different thinkers regardless of
their places in 'time or space.

In a characteristic

example~

Rousseau

was compared to Leibniz;

a: :thoroughly in4ividp.al way, from
Condillac to Leibtiiz. Historically~' thi"s' turning point is all'
the more remarkable since we can nowhere observe any direct
influence that Leibniz's fundamental thought might have exer
cised on Rousseau. The epistemology which RQusseau wove into
the ·Professions de foi du vicaire savoyard' frequently reminds
~s line by line of Leibniz's Noveaux Essais--but it is known that
this work was published only in the year 1165, from the manu
s~ript in the rb~rary in -Hanover, three years after the appear
ance of Emile.
.:

, Th:us Rousseau· .returned,. in

For Cassirer's purposes, the Noveaux Rssais might as ,'tvell have-been
published much earlier, at least early enough that Rousseau could

have copied it uline by line. tt
Despite the criticism of Cassirer's' penchant for structure and

affinity for schemata, he has had a profound influence on the general
community of historians.

His work in many areas was unique and he 

qid consi,d~rab1e original research. lOB

He has had some i~~_luenc~" on.

subsequent historians, especially with some
data.

io9

o~

the specifics of his

Even the abundance of criticisms of his works attests to
I

the seriousness with which he has been viewed as a historian.

l07 The

~estion

of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, pp .. 112-113.

l08Diekmann 'couples 'praise with criticism -in, his review of The
Philosophy of 'the Enlightenment; Peter Gay, in the introduction
his translation of The Question of Jean-Jacques-Rousseau, sees the
essay as ,"an aesthetic as ,well asintel.lectual achievement of "the
',first order," one of gr.eat s~gnificance in" the hist9ry of :;'nte-r:preta~
tions of Rousseau. (p. 24, see pp. 21-30.)

to-

~

I

I
i

109See the notes 'to Peter Gayts" The "Enlightenment: An Interpreta
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), vol. 2.
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But Cassirer used a paradigm charged with possibilities 'for
He accepted the idealist view that f1mind U and "matter U are

fallacy.

identical, 'that' 'tlmindU operates:: according, to the' rules of ,logie, 'and
, 110
..-that l~gic, c~n 1>~,' ~l?p'lie,d' to ~he' h~~to~1 ,of, though,t. ..' He used the'
analytic-synthetic idealist approach, the breakdown and recreation
of a body of data.

The history of thought--the history' 'of the tlmind"-

moved, from an analytical period to an ,organic one
process, Cassirer believed.

a never ending

And at each juncture, at: each organic

stage, there was a transitional figure to'bring
again:

in'

everything·tog~her

Nicholas of Cusa, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, and others.

Cassirer, in his response to the "crisis" situation, to the,plethora
of

F~agmented theori~s

of man, to an

thought, saw himself as a,new

ana~~tical

~~ansitional

period in' European '

figure.

His paradigm_ 'Was

a response to a "crisis" in' Kuhn's sense of the 'toJ'ord.
't~ithin

time,

the framework of 'Cassirer' s scheme', it

w~s

But at· the same
intended to'

provide the new synthesis in the development of the nmodern,mind. u
'Cassirer's synthetic paradigm fulfills the criteria Hollinger
names for "successful" works in the field. lll

And he must be lauded

for explaining his methodological position and consistently abiding,
But if the basic tenets of idealist

by it.

,p~ilos,ophy ar~

not ,accepted"

his entire model 'fails as a viable paradigm' for hi'storical"research'and
writing.

Implicit in the criticisms of ,Price, Skinner, Foucault, and

others is 'the recognition of the absurdity of these tenets. 'The pursuit

llOOn the idealist approach to histo'ry, see Coates and White, pp.
80-111.

111 See a bove, p. 4 •
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of the history of the "mind," of the "knowledge of knowledge," can
only lead to historical absurdities.

.,' r

"

.
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